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© 2015leave, while those giving birth after that date were entitled to 4 months
of paid leave and 12 months of unpaid leave. The increased time spent
with the child led to a 2 percentage point decline in high school drop-
out rates and a 5 percent increase in wages at age 30. These effects were
larger for the children of mothers who, in the absence of the reform,
would have taken very low levels of unpaid leave.ntroductionThere are huge disparities in maternity leave entitlements across dif-
ferent countries. At one extreme, countries in northern Europe, such as
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Sweden, Norway, and Germany, mandate very generous paid leave and
long periods of job protection after childbirth. At the other extreme, there
366 journal of political economyare a handful of countries, such as the United States, that have no man-
datory paid leave and offer little, if any, job protection after the birth of
a child ðInternational Labour Organization 1998Þ.
These disparities were much smaller 30–40 years ago. In several coun-
tries, new mothers had benefits similar to the ones currently in place in
the United States, where the federal mandatory leave, which is adopted
in almost all states, is only 12 weeks of unpaid leave for women working in
firms with 50 or more workers. One striking example, which is the focus
of our paper, is Norway. Prior to 1977, working mothers in Norway were
entitled to 12 weeks of unpaid leave but no paid leave. Currently, the
situation is very different: they are entitled to a full year of paid leave and
an additional year of job protection.
The example of Norway is not unique. Following the strong growth
in female labor force participation, maternity leave benefits have be-
come more generous across the world. In the United States, however,
they have remained fairly low, despite substantial debate on this topic.
A central question is whether the absence of stronger maternal employ-
ment protection and leave entitlements in the United States is detri-
mental to child development or whether the high levels of benefits in
northern Europe are mostly important for maternal health ðand parental
welfare more generallyÞ, with little consequence for children’s lives. In
other words, what is the impact ðon child outcomesÞ of parental time
with the child in the first months of life? This question is the focus of our
paper.
Empirically, this is a notoriously difficult issue to analyze, as empha-
sized, for example, by Bernal ð2008Þ and Dustmann and Schönberg ð2012Þ,
because mothers who spend more time with their children after birth
may have unobservable attributes that affect child development, or they
may use child care arrangements that are special in unobservable dimen-
sions. Furthermore, because additional time with children is generally as-
sociated with less time at work and thus lower household income, it is dif-
ficult to isolate the effects of the two variables.
In our paper, we address these empirical challenges by studying the
impact of a reform of maternity leave benefits in Norway on the long-
term outcomes of children, namely, their education and earnings at
ages 25–33. The reform we analyze increased mandatory paid maternity
leave from 0 to 4 months and mandatory unpaid maternity leave from 3 to
12 months.1
1 This is equivalent to moving from the current level of maternity leave entitlements in
the United States to those in Holland and several other countries in southern and central
Europe.
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This new set of benefits applied to all eligible mothers who had children
after July 1, 1977.2 We estimated their long-term impact on children us-
maternity leave benefits 367ing regression discontinuity, by comparing the outcomes of children of
eligible mothers born immediately after and immediately before this par-
ticular date. We were able to test for potential manipulation of the date
of birth.
We followed children until 2010, when they were 33 years of age. We
measured several medium- and long-term outcomes, such as high school
completion, college attendance, and wages up to age 33.
We begin with a simple look at the data. Using data only on individuals
ðand their mothersÞ born in June and July of 1977 ðimmediately before
and immediately after the reform was implementedÞ, we can compare
the outcomes of children in these two groups ðonly for eligible mothersÞ
by running a regression of the outcome of interest on an indicator for
being born in July. However, there may be differences in outcomes be-
tween children born in these two months of 1977 for reasons unrelated
to the reform, as emphasized in the extensive literature on month-of-
birth effects ðe.g., Black, Devereux, and Salvanes ½2011 present estimates
for NorwayÞ. Therefore, we use data from nearby years to estimate the dif-
ference in outcomes between children born in June and July in years
in which no reform took place and subtract this from the estimate of the
effect of being born in July ðvs. being born in JuneÞ obtained from the
1977 data, as in a difference-in-differences estimator.3
Table 1 presents estimates of the impact of the program, using the
single- ðcol. 1Þ and double- ðcol. 2Þ difference estimators for a subset of
the dependent variables we consider in the paper. The following child
outcomes are shown at the top: indicators of whether a person was a
high school dropout, whether the person ever attended college, and the
person’s log earnings at age 30. The results suggest that the reform
2 Eligibility criteria, involving work requirements, are discussed below in detail. About 35
percent of women giving birth in 1977 were ineligible for paid maternity leave benefits.
3 For the single-difference specification, we would run the following regression using
data for children born in June and July of 1977:
Yi 5 a1 b  D Julyi 1 ui ;
where Yi is the outcome of interest, D
July
i is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
was born in July, and b measures the impact of the reform on the outcome of interest among
children of eligible mothers. For the difference-in-differences estimator, using data from
children born in the months of June and July of 1975, 1978, 1979, and 1977, we can run
Yi 5 a1 g  D1977i 1 g  D1978i 1 g  D1979i 1 J  D Julyi
1 b  D Julyi D1977i 1 ui ;
where D1977i is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual was born in 1977. As before,
b measures the impact of the reform on the outcome of interest among children of eligible
mothers. Below we explain why 1976 is excluded from the analysis.
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reduced high school dropout rates by about 2–3 percentage points, in
creased college attendance by 3.5 percentage points ðonly in the double
June and July 1977, because we would not expect maternity leave benefits to have an impac
on birth weight, and we show later that this is indeed the case.This suggests that thedifference
in outcomes between children born before and after the reform arose because of the reform
and not unobserved differences in child health that could be manifested in differences in
birth weight.
TABLE 1










High school dropout 2.020* 2.032**
ð.011Þ ð.013Þ
College attendance .017 .036**
ð.014Þ ð.016Þ




Years of education 2.023 2.009
ð.063Þ ð.071Þ
Log income 2 years prior to the birth of the child 2.014 .003
ð.031Þ ð.029Þ
Outcomes:
Average log income1/21 year around year of birth .037 .008
ð.027Þ ð.031Þ
Employed 5 years after the birth of the child 2.002 2.007
ð.012Þ ð.014Þ
Log income 5 years after the birth of the child 2.018 2.080
ð.138Þ ð.157Þ
Note.—Column 1 shows the coefficients of a regression of each of the variables on an
indicator for being born in July 1977. The sample included only individuals born in June
and July of 1977. For col. 2, we added to the sample those born in June and July of 1975
1978, and 1979, and we regressed each of the variables on a year indicator, a month of birth
indicator, and the interaction of the two. We report the coefficient on the latter.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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difference specificationÞ, and increased earnings at age 30 by 5–7 per-
centage points.
We then examined two prebirth maternal variables, which should not
have been affected by the reform: the number of years of education of
the mother and her log annual income in 1975. In both these dimen-
sions, the sets of mothers who gave birth in June and in July of 1977 were
similar.4
4 We also checked whether there were differences in the birth weights of children born in
t
s
Finally, we found no impact of the reform onmaternal income around
the time the mother gave birth ðaverage log income in the year of birth
maternity leave benefits 369and the year after birthÞ. This is important because it means that the re-
form had no impact on the amount of unpaid leave taken by these moth-
ers. It is possible to infer how much unpaid maternity leave ðtime off
workÞ was taken by working mothers by analyzing how much their in-
come fell after giving birth.
We also examined maternal labor supply and income 5 years after the
birth of the child and found no significant effect of the reform on these
variables, using both single- and double-difference specifications.5 There-
fore, the most likely mechanism through which this reform operated was
an increase in the time spent with the child, with no short- or long-term
consequences for maternal employment or income.
In the rest of the paper we develop, expand, and discuss these results
in detail, showing the implementation of a regression discontinuity es-
timator that explores data on date of birth ðrelative to the date of the re-
formÞ linked to data on the adult outcomes of these children. The main
patterns of table 1 survive a more sophisticated estimation procedure.
We study the sensitivity of our results to various changes in the specifica-
tion and samples used.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a short review of
the literature. Section III gives background information on maternity
leave legislation in Norway, while Section IV presents the empirical
strategy. Section V presents the data and Section VI shows the results.
Section VII discusses the evidence on the possible mechanisms through
which the reform affected child outcomes. Section VIII presents con-
cluding remarks.
II. Short Review of Relevant LiteratureThere is a very extensive literature on this topic, so we will not review
it in detail. Good reviews of the literature on maternal employment
and child outcomes are available in Blau and Currie ð2006Þ and Bernal
and Keane ð2010Þ. The Economic Journal featured a recent symposium on
this topic ðGregg and Waldfogel 2005; Gregg et al. 2005; Tanaka 2005Þ.
The literature is fairly inconclusive and is plagued with empirical prob-
lems, as these papers document. The Society for Research in Child De-
velopment edited a recent volume on this topic ðBrooks-Gunn, Han, and
Waldfogel 2010Þ arguing that, at least for non-Hispanic whites in the
United States, maternal employment in the first year of life does not
have particularly detrimental consequences for children because its neg-
5 As opposed to more permanent effects of the reform on the labor market outcomes of
females, after employers and mothers fully adjust their expectations and behaviors.
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ative and positive aspects cancel each other out. However, as in most of
the literature, the authors caution against a causal interpretation of their
370 journal of political economyestimates.
Recent papers attempt to address the empirical problems of the pre-
vious literature by directly examining maternity leave reforms. For the
United States, Rossin ð2011Þ studies the effect of the 1993 reform on chil-
dren’s birth dates and infant health. She finds evidence of some positive
effects of the reform on children’s health outcomes. There is also a set
of recent papers studying Canadian reforms, focusing on short-term out-
comes for children, by Baker and Milligan ð2008a, 2008bÞ. These papers
find no significant effects on children’s outcomes.
In addition, there are also empirical analyses of the effect of maternity
leave reforms on children’s long-term outcomes using registry data with
very large sample sizes for Germany ðDustmann and Schönberg 2012Þ,
Denmark ðRasmussen 2010Þ, and Sweden ðLiu and Skans 2010Þ. As in our
study, these three papers explore exogenous variation in maternity leave
resulting from legislative reforms and are able to look at the long-term
outcomes of children. Our data challenge the main conclusion of these
papers, which is that maternity leave expansions have little or no effect
on the long-term outcomes of children.
Two central aspects of our study distinguish it from those above and
may explain our different results. First, we consider a change in mater-
nity leave entitlements that occurred at a time when they were at a very
low level, similar to that in the United States today. The three papers men-
tioned mostly consider expansions in maternity leave from an already
generous baseline level of benefits.
The earliest reform in Dustmann and Schönberg ð2012Þ is the closest
to ours and involved an expansion from 2 to 6 months of paid maternity
leave entitlements. Nevertheless, this is much less generous than the re-
form we consider herein because the payments women were entitled
to in the expansion period ðfrom the third to the sixth month after
childbirthÞ corresponded, on average, to only a third of their average pre-
birth income. As a result, there was only a small decrease in maternal
labor supply and a resulting small increase in the time spent with the
child. By contrast, in our case, we conjecture that the take-up of the 1977
reform in Norway was 100 percent for the eligible women ði.e., the full
4 monthsÞ. In sum, even though the 1979 German reform looks similar
to the 1977 Norwegian reform, in practice it was much less generous, and
it probably led to a smaller impact on maternal time spent at home.
The reform studied by Liu and Skans ð2010Þ was quite different from
the reform analyzed in this paper. They assess an extension of maternity
leave in Sweden from 12 to 15 months. In addition, the main alternative
to maternity leave in Sweden at the time of the reform was subsidized dayThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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care. Our study analyzes a reform affecting younger children, in a setting
where the main source of alternative care was informal and possibly low-
maternity leave benefits 371quality private-sector care.
TheDanish study analyzed an extra 6 weeks of leave in addition to a paid
maternity leave entitlement of 3½ months ðRasmussen 2010Þ. Hence,
when analyzing extensions of already-generous maternity benefits, these
studies found little or no impact.
The second important feature that distinguishes our work is that we
were able to examine the education and labor market outcomes of chil-
dren as late as age 33. Other papers have examined earlier educational or
labor market outcomes. One problem with examining early labor market
outcomes is that individuals’ careers may stabilize only much later.6 In ad-
dition, our data enabled us to link mothers with their children, allowing
us to perform a rich analysis of the impacts across various subgroups of
mothers. Our data also allowed us to construct good measures of eligibil-
ity for the reform, which is important because generally only a fraction of
mothers, that is, those who are working a certain minimum amount of
time, were eligible for these benefits.7
III. Maternity Leave Reform and Institutional BackgroundA. Maternity Leave Reform
In 1956, maternity leave benefits first became available to women in
Norway through the introduction of compulsory sickness insurance for
all employees. Eligible mothers were entitled to 12 weeks of essentially
unpaid maternity leave. This is basically the same level of benefits avail-
able to mothers in ðnearly all states inÞ the United States in 2011, pro-
vided that they work in firms with 50 or more employees.6 In fact, we do not find any effect of the reform on earnings at ages 25 and 26.
7 One drawback of our data is that they do not contain direct measures of maternal
employment. This information is not essential for estimating the effects of the reform, but it
is useful for understanding the mechanisms through which they are operating. We do,
however, observe total income in each year. The reform had no impact on maternal income
in 1977 and 1978. This means that the reform did not change the amount of unpaid leave
being taken by mothers who gave birth after the reform. We do not consider the reason for
this to be that the reform had no effect at all on leave-taking behavior because this is highly
unlikely. Below, we present indirect evidence suggesting that the new paid leave entitlement
was fully taken up by new mothers, and therefore, the lack of change in annual income is
just a result of unchanged levels of unpaid leave. For example, when we examine later re-
forms of maternity leave, for which we can observe employment data, we see close to full up-
take of the new benefits. Therefore, we argue that the reform led to an actual increase of
4 months in the paid leave taken by new mothers, without changing unpaid leave uptake
or maternal income. In addition, all the reforms of either paid or unpaid leave programs
examined in the literature described above had important impacts on the uptake of leave.
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On July 1, 1977, Norway introduced paid maternity leave and an in-
crease in unpaid leave.8 With this reform, parents were given the uni-
372 journal of political economyversal right to 18 weeks of paid leave with guaranteed job protection
before and after the birth of a child.9 Maternity leave payments were equiv-
alent to 18 weeks of the prebirth income from wages ði.e., 100 percent in-
come replacement for 18 weeksÞ. Of these 18 weeks, 6 had to be taken
by the mother alone, while the rest could be shared between both par-
ents. In practice, all leave was almost exclusively taken by the mother
ðRønsen and Sundström 2002Þ. In addition, parents also became entitled
to 1 year of unpaid job protection on top of the 18 weeks of paid and job-
protected maternity leave.
Not all mothers were eligible to receive the new benefits as eligibil-
ity depended on their work and income history. Only women who had
worked at least 6 of the 10 months immediately prior to giving birth and
were earning more than 10,000 Norwegian kroner ðNOKÞ annually were
eligible for leave and the payment.10
Because of limitations in our data ðwe could not measure maternal
employment directly, and we had only yearly income data for wages and
benefitsÞ, we had to rely on an imperfect measure of eligibility. We defined
eligible mothers as those who had a salary of at least NOK 10,000 in the
calendar year before giving birth. Our use of 12 rather than 10 months
of income to determine eligibility is likely to slightly overstate the num-
ber of eligible mothers. We estimate that two-thirds of all mothers who
gave birth in Norway in 1977 were eligible for maternity leave benefits.
We tried alternative definitions of eligibility, but these produced no sig-
nificant changes in our empirical results.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of mothers who were eligible for ma-
ternity leave entitlements in 1975–79 according to the birth month of the
child. Between 1975 and 1979, the proportion of eligible mothers was
always between 60 percent and 70 percent, and in 1977 it was about
8 These changes were introduced together with a new law increasing workers’ rights ðAr-
beidsmiljølovenÞ accepted on June 3, 1977, by the Parliament and introduced on July 1, 1977
ðsee Prepositions, Ot.prp. nr. 71 and Innst.o. nr. 90Þ. There were additional reforms after 1977.
From 1987 onward, the paid maternity leave was extended almost yearly until 1993. From
1993 to the present, Norway has had the same paid maternity leave of 42 weeks with
100 percent coverage or 52 weeks with 80 percent coverage. In this paper we have decided to
focus on the 1977 law for three reasons. First, the change affects what we believe is a critical
period for the child, for instance, because breast-feeding is still an issue. Second, it is easier
to assess the first change in the law because the latter reforms were anticipated to a larger
degree. Finally, given that data are available only until 2010, we have a much richer set of
available outcomes for children born in 1977 than for those born later. We leave the study of the
other reforms to future work.
9 A mother could take a maximum of 12 weeks of this leave before the birth of a child;
however, most mothers worked almost until the day of the birth as they wanted to save their
leave entitlement until after the child was born ðsurvey on fertility in 1977, Statistics NorwayÞ.
10 The amount of NOK 10,000 ðUS$1,725Þ refers to the lowest level of income providing
pension points in the Norwegian social security system in 1977.
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65 percent. As we can focus only on eligible mothers in our analysis, this
means that our estimates ignore 35 percent of mothers who gave birth
of 1978 at the earliest. We may still worry that mothers who gave birth close to July 1, 1977
were able to delay their delivery ðalthough we also think that this would have been a hard
thing to do at the timeÞ. Studying a much more recent time period, Gans and Leigh ð2009Þ
estimate that Australian mothers delayed childbirth ðby as much as a weekÞ in response to a
FIG. 1.—Proportion of mothers eligible for maternity leave from 1975 to 1979. The solid
line shows the fraction of eligible mothers among the total population of mothers who gave
birth in each month from January 1975 to December 1979.
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In order for us to be able to identify the effects of the reform on chil-
dren’s outcomes, it is crucial that mothers were not able to change their
eligibility status immediately after the reform was announced; other-
wise, the set of eligible mothers who gave birth immediately before and
immediately after the reform would not be comparable. The maternity
leave reform was introduced during a burst of legislative activity from
the sitting ðvery radicalÞ Parliament at the end of its term. It is unlikely
that the legislation was widely expected because it was introduced along
with a number of other changes and at the end of the legislative pe-
riod. The government report became official on April 15, 1977, and
was approved on June 13, 1977.11 This means that all women who gave
birth immediately after the introduction of the law in 1977 were already
pregnant when the law was announced,12 and because of the rule re-
garding working 6 out of the 10 months prior to giving birth, it was diffi-
11 Propositions and regulations from the government: Ot.prp nr. 61 and Innst.o. nr 61.
12 Possible effects on fertility will therefore not show up in the data before the beginning,
cult for women to change their eligibility status in the short run. We also
checked national newspapers around 1976 and 1977 for news about the
374 journal of political economyreform but found no evidence that newspapers reported on the reform
before June 1977.13 Therefore, it is plausible that eligibility status was ex-
ogenous for mothers who gave birth in 1977.
The 1970s in Norway were the decade of oil discovery, with increasing
labor force participation by women and the implementation of several
welfare reforms. We have studied all laws and reforms during that period
that may have had an impact on maternal and child outcomes. The only
one we found was the abortion law implemented on January 1, 1976. This
law made it easier for women to have an abortion within 12 weeks of
conception. The first cohort of children affected by this reform was born
around July 1976. This possibly gives rise to a discontinuity in observed
child outcomes between those born in June and July 1976, and hence, we
do not use 1976 as a comparison with 1977.
B. Institutional BackgroundAt the time of the maternity leave reform in 1977, the labor force par-
ticipation of women was relatively high in Norway. Figure 2 shows the
labor force participation in Norway compared with the United States
from 1970 to 1990 ðdistinguishing Norwegian women who were mothers
from those who were notÞ. In Norway, the labor force participation rate
around 1977 was about 50 percent for married women, who were the
most relevant group for our study, and around 70 percent for unmarried
women. The labor force participation of women was about the same in
Norway and the United States during the 1970s but much higher in the
former than in the latter by 1990.
It is also relevant to examine the provision of public child care. In the
mid-1970s, very few children aged 0–2 years were in day care in Norway.
Although day care centers provided coverage for 15 percent of children
aged 3–6 years in 1977, the coverage for the first 2 years was very low, at
only 1–2 percent. This means that the main alternative to maternal care
in the early years of the child’s life was informal care by nannies, grand-
parents, or neighbors.
IV. Empirical StrategyLet yið1Þ be the outcome for child i in the presence of the reform, and
let yið0Þ be the outcome for child i in the absence of the reform. Our
reform that changed fertility incentives ðmostly by changing the schedule of inductions and
caesarian sectionsÞ. As we use daily birth data, we can check whether this is also true in our13 Verdens Gang, June 30, 1977; Bergens Tidende, June 27, 1977, June 30, 1977; Aftenposten,
June 30, 1977.
data by studying whether there is any bunching of births immediately after the reform.
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main goal is to estimate the average impact of the reform on the long
term outcomes of the child: a5 Eðy ð1Þ2 y ð0ÞÞ.14
reform for the long-term outcomes of children whose mothers were exposed to it ði.e.
what is usually called “intent to treat”Þ? This is different from the question, What is the
impact of taking maternity leave on the long-term outcomes of children ðwhich corre
sponds to a different parameterÞ? We can answer the former question with our data, bu
not the latter.
FIG. 2.—Female employment in Norway and the United States from 1970 to 1990. The four
lines show the fraction of females working in the labor market. The first two lines show thi
for all Norwegian and US women. The other two lines represent married and unmarried
Norwegian women. Source: Statistics Norway, Bureau of Labor Statistics ðprojected from
OECD, Population Bulletin 63 ½2008Þ.
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i i
In order to estimate this parameter, we compare children born im-
mediately before and immediately after the reform, who should be sim-
ilar except for the fact that the mothers of those in the latter group ben-
efited from the change in maternity leave entitlements that occurred on
July 1, 1977.
For those women who gave birth in 1977, eligibility for the new ma-
ternity leave entitlements ðEiÞ was a deterministic function of the date on
which they gave birth ðXiÞ:
Ei 5 1fXi > cg; ð1Þ
where c is the cutoff point of July 1, 1977. Therefore, all mothers who
gave birth after c potentially could have received the treatment defined
by new maternity leave entitlements, while those who gave birth before c
were assigned to the control group. We used only eligible mothers ðas de-
fined in Sec. IIÞ in our main analysis.




The regression discontinuity ðRDÞ estimator for a is given by
376 journal of political economyaRD 5 E ½yið1ÞjXi 5 c2 E ½yið0ÞjXi 5 c: ð2Þ
As with any RD estimator, we are able to identify only a local effect, that
is, for those born around the time of the reform. However, this is one
case in which it is reasonable to conjecture that the effects of the reform
did not vary substantially with date of birth, in which case aRD should be
a consistent estimator of a.
Assuming that E½yið1Þ|Xi 5 c  and E½yið0Þ|Xi 5 c are continuous in x
ðcontinuity at x 5 c is all that is neededÞ, we can estimate them as follows:
E ½yið1ÞjXi 5 c5 lim
x↓c
E ½yi jXi 5 x;
E ½yið0ÞjXi 5 c5 lim
x↑c
E ½yi jXi 5 x:
The outcomes of interest for the child include dropping out of high
school and college attendance ðboth measured at age 30Þ, earnings at
age 30, years of education at age 30, the probability of having had a child
before age 19 for women, IQ for men, and earnings between the ages
of 25 and 33. The outcomes of interest for the mother include the num-
ber of months of unpaid leave and her employment and earnings 5 years
after giving birth. These are interesting because we can examine whether
the reform induced changes in the home environment that could ac-




E ½yi jXi 5 x2 lim
x↑c
E ½yi jXi 5 x
by taking the difference between the boundary points of two regression
functions of y on x : one for eligible women ðx ≤ cÞ and one for ineligible
women ðx > cÞ. We estimate these regression functions using a local lin-
ear regression ðFan 1992Þ, as in Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw ð2001Þ












½yi 2 h2 bðXi 2 cÞ2 tEi 2 gðXi 2 cÞEi 2: ð3Þ
The term aRD is estimated as
âRD 5 t̂: ð4Þ
We use the triangle kernel, which has been shown to be boundary op-
timal ðCheng, Fan, and Marron 1997Þ. We obtain standard errors as rec-This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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ommended in Lee and Lemieux ð2010Þ using heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors ðWhite 1980Þ. The choice of bandwidth is important, as
maternity leave benefits 377usual. We present our main results using a bandwidth of 90 days, but we
also present further results using both smaller and larger bandwidths.
We also check for the existence of date-of-birth manipulations by any
mothers delivering close to the date of the reform, which could poten-
tially affect our results. We confirm that the number of births did not
change in the days and weeks immediately preceding and following
the date of the reform. We also confirm that the characteristics of moth-
ers who gave birth immediately before and immediately after the reform
were virtually identical.
Finally, we examine what happens to our estimates when we drop
from our sample children who were born close to the date of the reform
ðwithin 1, 2, 4, or 6 weeks of the reformÞ. This allows us to examine the
sensitivity of our results to observations close to the discontinuity. When
we start dropping observations close to the discontinuity, we also move
away from the original RD design. It is possible that date of birth affects
children’s outcomes because, for example, the age at which children start
school depends on their day and month of birth, and this is potentially
related to their adult education and earnings ðsee Black et al. ½2011 for
evidence for NorwayÞ. In this case, aRD estimates a1 lBirth, where a is the
impact of the reform and lBirth is a date-of-birth effect. If we assume that
the date-of-birth effect does not vary across years, we can combine the
RD with the difference-in-differences ðDDÞ specification by constructing
two types of control groups: one consisting of children born in 1975, 1978,
and 1979 to eligible mothers ðour main specificationÞ and another con-
sisting of children born in 1977 to ineligible mothers.
We begin by estimating equation ð3Þ for those in either of the control
groups and for those born to eligible mothers in 1977. Then we calculate
âRD;con 5 t̂con 5 lBirth;
âRD;1977 5 t̂1977 5 a1 lBirth:
As there was no reform for the control groups, âcon ðthe RD estimate for
those in a control groupÞ should capture only date-of-birth effects. On the
other hand, âRD;1977 confounds the effects of the reform with potential date-
of-birth effects. Under the relatively mild assumptions that the two effects
do not interact and that date-of-birth effects are the same ðaround JulyÞ
for those born in the control years, for those born to ineligible mothers
in 1977, and for those born to eligible mothers in 1977, we can estimate
the effect of the reform as âRD-DD 5 âRD;1977 2 âRD;con.
Before we proceed to the next section, it is important to clarify what
questions we can and cannot answer with this empirical strategy. We can
answer questions about the outcomes of children benefiting from dif-This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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ferent amounts of time with their mother early in life, induced by changes
in maternity leave entitlements. However, maternity leave reform is about
378 journal of political economymuch more than that. For example, it may also affect fertility and em-
ployment decisions in the medium run, but the full adjustment of these
behaviors to the new maternity leave regime is likely to happen slowly.
Therefore, we cannot fully learn about the outcomes of children liv-
ing under different maternity leave regimes because this would require
waiting for the full adjustment of the fertility and employment habits
of women ðand possibly their spousesÞ. In fact, the mothers of children
born in June and July of 1977 are likely to have engaged in similar ad-
justments to fertility and employment in the medium run, especially if
they were considering having more children ðnote that we will show that
there were no differences in completed fertility and employment be-
tween mothers with children born in June and July 1977Þ. What we can
answer is the question, How important is the time that mothers spend
with their children in their first year of life?
V. Data DescriptionOur data source is the Norwegian Registry data maintained by Statistics
Norway. It is a linked administrative data set that covers the population
of Norwegians up to 2010 and is a collection of different administrative
registers providing information about each Norwegian’s date of birth,
educational attainment, labor market status, earnings, and a set of de-
mographic variables ðage and genderÞ as well as information on fami-
lies. To ensure that all individuals in the sample went through the Nor-
wegian educational system, we included only individuals born in Norway.
We were able to link individuals to their parents, and it was possible to
gather labor market information for both.
The main outcome variables we consider for children are dropout rates
from high school, college attendance, and earnings at age 30.15 High
school dropouts were defined as all children who did not obtain a 3-year
high school diploma, and college attendance was determined from the
annual education files identifying whether a person ever started college.
Earnings were measured as total gross pension-qualifying earnings re-
ported in the tax registry and were available from 1967 to 2010. These
were not top coded, and they included labor earnings, taxable sickness
benefits, unemployment benefits, and parental leave payments.
We also collected data on maternal income, measured 2 and 5 years
after the birth of the child. This is useful for examining potential chan-
15 Our measure of child educational attainment is reported by the educational establish-
ment directly to Statistics Norway, thereby minimizing any measurement error associated with
misreporting. This educational register started in 1970.
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nels through which maternity leave affected child outcomes, namely, by
promoting the attachment of women to the labor market.
maternity leave benefits 379In order to construct a measure of unpaid leave, we started by cal-
culating a measure of the mothers’ prebirth monthly income by divid-
ing their 1976 earnings by 12. We then calculated their total earnings in
1977–80 and divided them by our estimate of the monthly income in
1976, thereby obtaining a measure of the number of months of unpaid
leave during the first 36 months after birth. For this calculation to work,
the assumption is that 1976 earnings are a good approximation of po-
tential postbirth earnings ðthe earnings that the mother would have
received had she not gone on unpaid leaveÞ, adjusted for inflation.16 We
limited ourselves to a window of 36 months because the further we move
away from prebirth earnings, the more likely it is that earnings may dif-
fer because of a change of job, taking on part-time work, the presence
of new children, and other factors unrelated to the 1977 reform.17 We as-
sumed that the paid leave had a take-up rate of 100 percent for those
who gave birth after July 1977. Section VII.A gives more information on
the plausibility of this assumption.
The IQ data were taken from the Norwegian military records for the
relevant cohorts, tested at the age of 18–19. Military service is compulsory
for every able young man. IQ at this age is particularly interesting, as this
is about the time of entry into higher education ðor into the labor market
for those who decide not to go to universityÞ. The IQ measure used was a
composite score from three speed IQ tests: arithmetic, word similarities,
and figures ðsee Sundet, Barlaug, and Torjussen ½2004 for detailsÞ. The
figures test is similar to the Raven Progressive Matrix test ðCronbach and
Lee 1964Þ, the arithmetic test is quite similar to the arithmetic test in the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale ðWAIS; Cronbach and Lee 1964; Sundet
et al. 2005Þ, and the word test is similar to the vocabulary test in WAIS.
The composite IQ test score was an unweightedmean of the three subtests.
The IQ score was reported in stanine ðSTAndard NINEÞ units, a method
of standardizing raw scores into a nine-point standard scale that has a dis-
crete approximation to a normal distribution, with a mean of five and a
standard deviation of two.
16 It is useful to illustrate this with a specific example. If the child was born in June 1977, we
subtract 6 months of 1976 monthly earnings from the mother’s 1977 earnings and compare
the remaining earnings in 1977 and 1978 with her earnings in 1976. If the mother earns half
of her 1976 earnings in the 18 months after the birth ðcorresponding to 6 months of full-
time workÞ, she has taken 12 months of unpaid leave. If she earns her 1976 earnings in the
18 months following birth, she has taken 6 months of leave. If the mother was able to take
4 months of paid leave ðby giving birth after the reformÞ, then we take that into account by
subtracting 4 months of wages from the postbirth income. However, we count this as paid,
not unpaid, leave.
17 However, remember that we will show that all these factors are the same for mothers
who gave birth before and after the reform, so they will potentially affect only the estimate
of the level of unpaid leave and not the difference ðeffect of the reformÞ.
This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Teenage pregnancy was constructed as an indicator variable taking a
value equal to one if the girl had given birth to a child before turning 20
380 journal of political economyand zero otherwise.
The distance to grandparents variable was created using post code
information for the parents of each child in the study and post code in-
formation for both sets of grandparents in 1980. Living in the same post
code area implies living within a maximum of a few blocks of each other,
which means it was possible to have daily contact. We had post code
information for about 80 percent of the sample. We created a distance
dummy variable equal to one if the family lived in the same post code
area as at least one set of grandparents and zero otherwise.
The rural-urban variable was constructed using information from Sta-
tistics Norway on the degree of centralization of municipalities in Norway.
Urban municipalities included all municipalities with a large town center
or close to a large town center, while rural municipalities had small or al-
most nonexisting city centers.
The working part-time variable was constructed using information
from the 1980 census on whether mothers worked full-time, part-time,
or not at all. We defined working part-time in 1980 as working between 10
and 1,300 hours per year versus the alternative of not working or work-
ing more than 1,300 hours per year.
The completed fertility of mothers was constructed using the pop-
ulation files in 2010 with information on each woman’s total number of
children. As we measured the total number of children 33 years after the
reform, this should capture the completed fertility for all mothers who
gave birth in 1977.VI. ResultsA. Descriptive Statistics
We focus only on mothers who were eligible for the reform, and there-
fore, it is important to show how they compared with those who were
not eligible. We saw from figure 1 that the proportion of mothers who
were eligible for maternity leave entitlements was about 65 percent in
the year of the reform. This means that 35 percent of mothers who gave
birth in that year and their children are not accounted for in our esti-
mates of the impact of the reform on child outcomes because the mother
was not eligible for maternity leave. Interestingly, current labor force
participation rates in OECD countries are generally not much higher
than 65 percent, except in the Scandinavian countries, where they are
often above 80 percent.
Table 2 displays the main characteristics of eligible mothers and their
children ðborn in 1977Þ compared with those of ineligible mothers andThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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their children. It is clear that eligible mothers had more education than
ineligible mothers. They were also more likely to be employed after birth
TABLE 2








High school dropout .186 .276
ð.388Þ ð.447Þ
College attendance .46 .35
ð.50Þ ð.48Þ
Log earnings at age 30 12.6 12.5
ð.74Þ ð.76Þ
Mothers:
Years of education 10.63 9.61
ð2.18Þ ð1.72Þ
Age at childbirth ðin yearsÞ 26.1 26.5
ð.028Þ ð.041Þ
Income in 1975a ðin NOKÞ 94,088 10,563
ð68,621Þ ð26,417Þ
Employed 2 years after childbirth .725 .362
ð.447Þ ð.481Þ
Employed 5 years after childbirth .758 .534
ð.428Þ ð.499Þ
Income in 1982a ðin NOKÞ 71,216 29,434
ð73,324Þ ð48,202Þ
Note.—Entries are the means of the variables presented for the group of eligible ðcol. 1Þ
and ineligible ðcol. 2Þ mothers in 1997. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses
a Consumer price index adjusted to 1998 NOK.
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than ineligible mothers, and, as a consequence, their income was higher
during that period. Their income 2 years before giving birth was nine times
higher than that of ineligible mothers, presumably because many in the
latter group did not work. Children of eligible mothers had lower high
school dropout rates and higher college attendance rates, but similar
earnings at age 30, compared with the children of ineligible mothers. In
summary, eligible and ineligible mothers and their children were two
very different groups. This means that we cannot safely extrapolate our
findings to the latter group of mothers and their children.
The average level of unpaidmaternity leave taken at the time was quite
high, even for those mothers who gave birth before the reform was im-
plemented. For our preferred measure, average unpaid leave was 8 months
for those who gave birth before July 1977 according to our estimates, and
it barely changed for those who gave birth after this date. The 25th per-
centile was about 2 months, and the 75th percentile was about 11 months.
Any expansion in the time mothers spent with their newborns resulting
from the reform was in addition to this preexisting level of leave.
Before proceeding to the results, we would like to check whether the
treatment and control groups were balanced in terms of their ðprereformÞ
382 journal of political economycharacteristics. An imbalance could indicate a threat to the validity of our
method, suggesting the possibility that a nonrandom set of mothers ma-
nipulated the date of birth of their children ðseeGans and Leigh 2009Þ. The
various panels of figure 3 show how the observable prereform character-
istics of mothers varied with the day on which they gave birth, allowing us
to check whether they were identical for mothers who gave birth imme-
diately before and immediately after the reform. Maternal years of edu-FIG. 3.—Mothers’ prereform characteristics in the vicinity of the reform date. a, Moth
ers’ years of education. b, Mothers’ age at time of childbirth. c, Mothers’ income in 1975
d, Parents’ urban location in 1976. e, Distance to grandparents in 1980. f, Birth weight o
child, in grams. Each data point corresponds to the average value of each outcome, organized
according to date of birth ðin 1-week binsÞ. Dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutof
of July 1, 1977 ðnormalized to zeroÞ. The solid line represents fitted values for a local linear
regression with a bandwidth of 91 days. The window includes all children born in 1977 to
eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. The dashed lines mark the
95 percent confidence interval.
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cation, age at birth, and income in 1975 were stable across birth months,
and we see no discontinuity after July 1, 1977. In addition, there was no
maternity leave benefits 383discontinuity regarding the urban location of the parents in 1976, the
distance to grandparents in 1980 ðalthough this variable is available only
for 1980Þ, or the birth weight of the child.
In figure 4, we display the number of children born to eligible moth-
ers in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979, by week of birth. This figure shows
very similar numbers of births in the days immediately before and
immediately after the reform was implemented. In sum, selective ma-
nipulation of the day or week of birth is not likely to be a serious concern
in our data. This is quite reasonable, given that in 1977 it was probably
difficult to delay childbirth much beyond the due date.
B. Children’s OutcomesIn table 3, we present our main estimates of the impact of the reform on
a set of children’s outcomes using date-of-birth data. The first row shows
the RD results, while the second row presents the DD results using theFIG. 4.—The number of children born to eligible mothers in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979
by week of birth. The dashed vertical line denotes the reform cutoff of July 1, 1977
ðnormalized to zeroÞ. The window includes all children born in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979
to eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. The different lines plo
the average number of births in 1-week intervals for each year separately.
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cohorts born in 1975, 1978, and 1979 as a control group. In column 1,
we see a negative effect of the reform of about 22 percentage points on
maternity leave benefits 385children’s dropout rates, which is statistically significant at the 10 per-
cent level.
When we take into account potential date-of-birth effects in the DD
specifications, our estimate of the impact of the reform on children’s
dropout rates barely changes, but the standard error declines substan-
tially. We see the same pattern for college attendance—namely, an in-
crease of around 2 percentage points—but this is statistically significant
only in the DD specification ðeffects on completed years of schooling show
a similar patternÞ. In addition, we see a positive effect on earnings at age 30
of 6.2 percent as estimated by RD, which decreases to 5 percent in the DD
specification.18
In table 4 we use different control groups. The first line uses as a
control group children born to ineligible mothers. The second line
presents a triple-difference estimator whereby we take differences across
eligibility statuses ðeligible vs. ineligibleÞ and across years ð1977 vs. 1975,
1978, 1979Þ. Overall, we find the same results, although they are slightly
less precise, when we use only ineligible mothers who gave birth in 1977
as the control group.
Table 5 reports results using the whole sample ðeligible and ineligible
mothersÞ. Those results compare well with the results for the sample of
eligible mothers, but the coefficients are smaller, and only the coeffi-
cient for log earnings at age 30 is statistically different from zero. This
is expected because 35 percent of all mothers were not affected by the
reform, so when the whole sample is used, the estimated impact of the
reform will be diluted. The reason we perform this check is that it gives
us estimates for a sample that is independent of the procedure used to
define eligibility ðalthough we also checked that alternative definitions
of eligibility status had no impact on our resultsÞ.
In figure 5 we present graphically the RD results of table 3. We clearly
see reform-induced discontinuities in dropout rates and earnings at
age 30. The effect on college attendance, however, is not as clear.19
18 Interestingly, in table 3, there is also a positive effect on IQ, although it is statistically
significant only in the RD specification. IQ scores are available only for men, but because of
the large sample sizes, we can still get precise estimates of the effect of the reform on IQ.
The RD estimates show an effect of 0.2, or 9 percent of a standard deviation. When es-
timates of the effect of IQ on wages from the wage regressions for slightly older cohorts of
individuals are used, this translates into more than a 1 percent difference in earnings as an
adult. We do not see any effect of the reform on teenage pregnancy or on birth weight
in any of the specifications. We would expect the effect on birth weight to be zero if our
empirical strategy is valid as birth weight is predetermined by changes in the mother’s time
at home.
19 There are also less clear patterns for years of schooling and IQ and no discontinuity
in teenage pregnancy.
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TABLE 4











RD-DD ineligibles 2.016 .009 .054**
ð.012Þ ð.016Þ ð.026Þ
½.21 ½.43 ½12.5
Observations 23,658 23,658 22,523
RD-DD years and ineligibles 2.016** .006 .043**
ð.008Þ ð.012Þ ð.018Þ
½.22 ½.40 ½12.5
Observations 98,455 98,455 93,731
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result
of the maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions
including triangular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each
side of the discontinuity. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at
the date of birth. Numbers in brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the
prereform sample. We include the number of observations for each outcome. The RD
estimates used only eligible births in 1977, whereas the RD-DD estimates used eligible
births in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
TABLE 5
Impact of the Reform on Children’s Outcomes for Both











RD-DD years ð1975, 1978, and 1979Þ 2.011 .011 .026**
ð.007Þ ð.009Þ ð.013Þ
½.22 ½.40 ½12.5
Observations 98,455 98,455 93,731
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions including trian-
gular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the disconti-
nuity. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth.
Numbers in brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample.
We include the number of observations for each outcome. The RD-DD estimates used
eligible births in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Therefore, the most robust impact of the reform seems to be at the low
end of the education distribution, with treated children being less likely
FIG. 5.—Impact of the reform on children’s outcomes. a, High school dropout rates. b, Col-
lege attendance. c, LnðearningsÞ at age 30. d, Years of schooling. e, Teenage pregnancy. f, IQ
score. Each data point corresponds to the average value of each outcome organized ac-
cording to date of birth ðin 1-week binsÞ. The dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutoff
of July 1, 1977 ðnormalized to zeroÞ. The solid line represents fitted values for a local linear
regression with a bandwidth of 91 days. The window includes all children born in 1977 to
eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. The dashed lines mark the
95 percent confidence interval.
maternity leave benefits 387to drop out of high school. This also shows up as higher earnings by age
30. It is worthwhile pointing out that if we use earlier measures of
earnings ðsay, at age 25Þ, we cannot detect this effect. It is important to
wait until individuals have completed their education and acquired
some maturity in the labor market. Figure 6 shows the estimates for theThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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whole earnings profile from ages 25 to 33. Notice how the impact of the
reform on earnings becomes significant only after age 30 and then re
FIG. 6.—Effects of the reform on children’s log earnings at ages 25–33. a, Effects on
children’s log earnings at ages 25–33: RD estimates. b, Effects on children’s log earnings a
ages 25–33: RD-DD estimates. The lines labeled “point estimates” are the reform effects cal
culated using the RD ðpanel aÞ and RD-DD ðpanel bÞmodels on log earnings. The dashed line
mark the 95 percent confidence intervals. The x -axes show the ages of the children, ranging
from 25 to 33 years.
388 journal of political economy
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mains stable up to age 33. It is also noteworthy that we found a positive
and statistically significant impact of the reform on the present value of
the child’s earnings ðbetween ages 25 and 33Þ.
Next, we present the sensitivity of our results to the choice of band-
width. Figure 7 shows the estimates of the impact of the reform ðand
corresponding confidence intervalsÞ for different values of the band-
width ðwhich vary along the horizontal axisÞ. As the main outcomes, we
considered dropout rates, college attendance, and log earnings at age 30.
The graphs on the left correspond to the RD estimates, and those on the
right correspond to RD-DD estimates.
The point estimates were not very sensitive to the choice of band-
width, but as expected, the RD results were less precise for the smaller
bandwidth. This is less of an issue for the DD estimates, which are not as
dependent on the observations in the immediate vicinity of the date of
the reform.
We next present the sensitivity of the results in table 3 to observations
in the vicinity of the discontinuity. This is important because of the
potential of strategic behavior, as indicated by Gans and Leigh ð2009Þ. In
order to address this issue, we present different estimates of the im-
pact of the reform obtained by successively removing from the sample
children born within 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 weeks of the date of the reform
ðbefore and afterÞ and reestimating the model using the remaining sam-
ple ðBarreca et al. 2012Þ. The results of this exercise are shown in fig-
ures 8A ðdropout ratesÞ, 8B ðcollege attendanceÞ, and 8C ðlog earnings
at age 30Þ for both the RD and the RD-DD specifications used in tables 3
and 4. On the horizontal axis of each graph, we show how many weeks of
births we are deleting on either side of the discontinuity when comput
FIG. 7.—The effect of bandwidth on the estimated impacts on dropout rates, college
attendance, and log earnings age 30. a, Dropout rates: RD. b, Dropout rates: RD-DD. c, College
attendance: RD. d, College attendance: RD-DD. e, LnðearningsÞ age 30: RD. f, LnðearningsÞ
age 30: RD-DD. The lines labeled “point estimates” show the reform effects on dropou
rates ðpanels a and bÞ, college attendance ðpanels c and dÞ, and log earnings at age 30
ðpanels e and f Þ. The dashed lines mark the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the x -axi
are different bandwidths, ranging from 30 to 180 days.
maternity leave benefits 389
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s
ing each estimate. On the vertical axis, we show the size of each estimate.
The graphs on the left of each figure show the RD estimates, and those on
the right show the RD-DD estimates.
The RD results were robust to small changes in the sample. However,
they were sensitive to very large changes in the sample. This is expected
because the RD design makes sense only when we use observations in
the close vicinity of the date of the reform. Once we delete observations
FIG. 8A.—Robustness to changes in window length: dropout rates. a, Dropout rates: RD.
b, Dropout rates: RD-DD using nonreform years as controls. c, Dropout rates: RD-DD using
ineligible mothers as controls. d, Dropout rates: RD-DD using ineligible mothers and
nonreform years as controls. The lines labeled “point estimates” are the reform effects on
dropout rates calculated using the RD ðpanel aÞ and RD-DD ðpanel bÞ models, RD-DD in-
eligible ðpanel cÞ model, and RD-DD years and ineligibles ðpanel dÞ model. The dashed
lines mark the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the x -axes are the number of weeks
omitted around the discontinuity. The length of the window is kept constant. The baseline
we use in all regressions is 0 weeks omitted around the discontinuity.
390 journal of political economyfrom the sample births close to that date, we can no longer apply this
method.
However, the DD estimates would still be valid because they compared
children born to eligible mothers immediately before and immediately
after the reform date in 1977, relative to a control group, which could
be the group of children born to eligible mothers in adjacent nonreform
years, or the group of children born to ineligible mothers ðor a combi-
nation of bothÞ. Figures 8A and 8C show that our estimates of the im-
pact of the reform on high school dropout rates and log earnings at
age 30 were remarkably robust to large changes in the sample ðincluding
the deletion from the sample of all births occurring in June and July,
which would correspond to dropping births occurring within 4–6 weeks
of the date of the reformÞ. Figure 8B shows that the estimated impacts
of the reform on college attendance were statistically indistinguishableThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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from zero once we moved away from the immediate vicinity of the re
form date.
FIG. 8B.—Robustness to changes in window length: lnðearningsÞ age 30. a, LnðearningsÞ
at age 30: RD. b, LnðearningsÞ at age 30: RD-DD using nonreform years as controls
c, LnðearningsÞ at age 30: RD-DDusing ineligiblemothers as controls. d, LnðearningsÞ at age 30
RD-DD using ineligible mothers and nonreform years as controls. The lines labeled “poin
estimates” are the reform effects on dropout rates calculated using the RD ðpanel aÞ and RD
DD ðpanel bÞ models, RD-DD ineligible ðpanel cÞ model, and RD-DD years and ineligible
ðpanel d Þmodel. The dashed lines mark the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the x -axe
are the number of weeks omitted around the discontinuity. The length of the window is kep
constant. The baseline we use in all regressions is 0 weeks omitted around the discontinuity
maternity leave benefits 391
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Table 6 estimates the impacts of being born immediately after July 1
using births in all the control years ð1975, 1978, 1979Þ and births from
ineligible mothers. If our strategy is valid, these coefficients should be
zero. There is only one coefficient in this table that is statistically dif-
ferent from zero: the estimated impact on earnings using births in 1979.
However, the sign is opposite to the sign of the effect for 1977.
VII. Interpretation of Empirical Results and Suggested MechanismsIn the previous section, we established that the maternity leave reform
had a substantial impact on the schooling and earnings of children. In
this section, we attempt to understand the mechanisms through which
this happened, using the limited information from the administrative
ecords we used. The results we present in this section are not individ-
ally decisive, but together they tell a consistent story.
FIG. 8C.—Robustness to changes in window length: college attendance. a, College at-
ndance: RD. b, College attendance: RD-DD using nonreform years as controls. c, College
ttendance: RD-DD using ineligible mothers as controls. d, College attendance: RD-DD using
eligible mothers and nonreform years as controls. The lines labeled “point estimates” are
e reform effects on dropout rates calculated using the RD ðpanel aÞ and RD-DD ðpanel bÞ
odels, RD-DD ineligible ðpanel cÞ model, and RD-DD years and ineligibles ðpanel dÞmodel.
he dashed lines mark the 95 percent confidence intervals. On the x -axes are the number
f weeks omitted around the discontinuity. The length of the window is kept constant. The
aseline we use in all regressions is 0 weeks omitted around the discontinuity.










A. Time with the ChildThe main problem of our data set is that it does not have a direct mea-
sure of maternal employment or leave-taking behavior.20 So how can we
be confident that the reform significantly affected the leave-taking be-
havior of mothers?
First, Rønsen and Sundström ð1996Þ show that for the mothers who
gave birth to children in Norway in the period 1968–88, almost no one
returned to work within 4 months of giving birth. Second, in a survey
conducted in 1977 on the fertility behavior of women in Norway ðby
Statistics NorwayÞ, 60 percent of respondents thought that mothers
20 This is a typical problem when studying reforms that happened a long time ago. The
main advantage of going back in time is the ability to measure the long-term outcomes of
children.
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hould stay home for the first 2 years after giving birth. In addition, the
eform provided mothers with their full prebirth salary for 4 months,
TABLE 6











D 1975 .012 2.019 2.018
ð.012Þ ð.017Þ ð.021Þ
½.20 ½.47 ½12.4
bservations 15,818 15,818 15,140
D 1978 .018 2.019 2.004
ð.013Þ ð.016Þ ð.021Þ
½.17 ½.43 ½12.5
bservations 16,053 16,053 15,325
D 1979 .016 2.026 2.055*
ð.012Þ ð.016Þ ð.033Þ
½.20 ½.42 ½12.5
bservations 16,675 16,675 15,919
eligible in 1977 2.022 .020 .024
ð.023Þ ð.025Þ ð.040Þ
½.27 ½.35 ½12.5
bservations 8,633 8,633 8,175
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
lacebo maternity leave reforms on July 1, 1975 ðfirst rowÞ, 1978 ðsecond rowÞ, 1979 ðthird
owÞ, and 1977 ðfourth rowÞ. We used local linear regressions including triangular weights,
bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the discontinuity. Numbers
parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in brackets
re the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We include the number
f observations for each outcome. The RD estimates for the first three rows used only
ligible births in 1975, 1978, and 1979, respectively ð182 days on either side of the dis-
ontinuityÞ. The RD estimates for the last row used only ineligible births in 1977 ð182 days on
ither side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.




















which represents a strong incentive for full take-up.
Third, because we could directly measure the days of paid leave from
1992 onward, we were able to check to what extent eligible mothers took
up ðsubsequentÞ maternity leave benefits by studying the 1992 and 1993
reforms ðsee fig. 9Þ. Before the April 1992 reform, mothers were able to
take 224 days of leave at full coverage or 280 days at 80 percent cover-
age. For mothers who gave birth to children in March 1992, the average
take-up of paid leave was 250 days ðwhich is close to the average of 224
and 280Þ. After 1992, there was an increase in maternity leave entitle-
ments to 245 days of full coverage or 310 days of 80 percent coverage. We
observe that the average paid leave taken was 275 days for mothers who
gave birth in April 1992. This figure is slightly higher, at 280, in MarchThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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993, immediately before the 1993 reform, which increased the paid
ave to 266 days of full coverage or 336 days of 80 percent coverage. By
FIG. 9.—Impacts of reforms in 1992 and 1993 on mothers’ days of paid leave. a, Days of
ave in 1992. b, Days of leave in 1993. Each observation is the average outcome in 1-month
ins based on the birth month of the child. The reforms were on April 1, 1992, and April 1,
993. The solid lines are fitted triangular local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 3
onths. The window includes all children born in 1992 ðpanel aÞ and 1993 ðpanel bÞ to
ligible mothers. The gray lines are the actual leave entitlements specified in the policies in
992 and 1993.








April 1993, the average leave taken was almost 310 days. Given the high
levels of leave take-up and strong reactions to these reforms in the 1990s, it
is reasonable to assume that the take-up of paid leave was close to 100
percent in the sample we are using.21
Therefore, we are confident that after the 1977 reform, all mothers
were taking 4 months of paid leave. A natural follow-up question is, Was
there a change in unpaid leave take-up as a result of the reform? The
best way to answer this question in our data set is by studying what hap-
pened to maternal income, which included maternity benefits, before
and after the reform ðbecause we do not directly observe the days of
leave takenÞ.22 An increase in maternal income in the period immedi-
ately after the birth may indicate a reduction in the unpaid leave taken,
and the opposite could be inferred from a decrease in maternal in-
come ðperhaps in substitution of the additional paid leave mothers be-
came entitled toÞ.
We examined maternal income in the years surrounding the reform
for those who gave birth to children immediately after and immediately
before the reform, and we found no impact of the reform on these var-
iables. This is shown in table 7, which indicates that there was no change
in the unpaid leave taken by mothers. This result holds independently
21 We should also point out that the analyses of other reforms in other countries for
which there are data available on maternal employment all indicate a substantial increase
in the amount of leave taken after each reform.
22 Remember that all maternity benefits are part of our measure of income.
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of the measure of earnings we use: income in 1977, average income be-
tween 1976 and 1978, or average income between 1975 and 1979. This is
396 journal of political economytrue not only of the mean but also of the whole distribution of income.
In addition, as discussed above, with these data, it is possible to predict
how much unpaid leave was taken by each mother by comparing her
usual earnings in a year before childbirth to her earnings in a year ðand
subsequent yearsÞ after childbirth.
We find no effects of the reform on the amount of unpaid leave taken
by mothers, as shown in table 7. This is not surprising because we em-
phasized above that there was no change in the average annual income
of mothers who gave birth immediately before and immediately after
the date of the reform, independent of the measure of earnings we use.
In summary, this means that, whatever the measure of unpaid leave we
use, we can find no change in the amount of unpaid leave taken by moth-
ers who gave birth immediately before versus immediately after the re-
form; otherwise, there would have been an increase in their income.
Therefore, even if our measure of unpaid leave is imperfect, we can be
confident that there was no large change in unpaid leave levels as a re-
sult of the reform. Even with no average response in unpaid leave, it is
interesting to see whether there were any effects on the distribution of
unpaid leave. In figure 10, we see no such response. We cannot rule out
the possibility that not all mothers took the full 4 months of paid leave,
although the earlier evidence provided shows that this was likely to be
the case ðStatistics Norway, fertility survey of 1977Þ.
Notice that, even if the reform led to no change in family resources
during the initial period of the child’s life, it induced a slight change in
the timing of these resources. Paid leave allows mothers to receive ben-
efits immediately after their child is born, whereas unpaid leave does
not. However, it is not likely that this change in the timing of benefits
dramatically affects child outcomes unless we consider the extreme case
of credit constraints. In order to investigate this further, below we pre-
sent an analysis of the effects of the reform for mothers with different
levels of prereform income. Poorer mothers were more likely to be credit
constrained, so our idea was to use prereform income as an indicator of
the severity of such constraints.
B. Maternal Labor Market OutcomesIt is possible that the reform increased the labor market attachment of
mothers. The reason is the extensive job protection they became enti-
tled to, which allowed them to come back to their old job more than a
year after giving birth. Therefore, it is conceivable that children born
in the postreform period had better outcomes not only because they
spent more time with their mothers during their first year of their life,
but also because their mothers became more attached to the labor mar-This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ket in the medium and long run, thereby becoming able to generate
more income but also spending more time at work.
24 In table 10 below, we present the results according to distance to grandparents and
centralization ðurban vs. ruralÞ.
FIG. 10.—Impacts of the reform on quantiles of predicted months of unpaid leave. The
reform cutoff of July 1, 1977, is normalized to zero. The window includes all children born
in 1977 to eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. The different line
plot the average number of months of unpaid leave in 1-week intervals for each quantile o
predicted unpaid leave taken by the mother ð1–9Þ separately.
maternity leave benefits 397
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Table 7 shows our main results. We do not find any long-term effects
of the reform on mothers’ employment 2 and 5 years after the reform or
on their earnings 5 years after.23 This supports the idea that our esti-
mates of the impact of the reform on children’s outcomes can be di-
rectly related to mothers’ time investments in children during the first
year of life.
In figure 11, we present the results of table 7 graphically. The figure
confirms the results of the table. There is no discontinuity in long-term
labor market outcomes.
C. Maternal EducationIn this section we examine whether the impacts of the maternity leave
extension varied with the level of education of the mother.24 We split
23 We have also examined mothers’ earnings between 1 and 10 years after birth, and this
gives similar results, showing no long-term effect of the reform on income.
the sample into two groups: mothers with less than 10 years of educa-
tion and mothers with 10 years or more of education. The results are
FIG. 11.—Impacts of the reform on mothers’ outcomes. a, Predicted months of unpaid
leave. b, Log income in the years before and after childbirth. c, Employed 2 years after
childbirth. d, Employed 5 years after childbirth. e, Log income 5 years after childbirth. Each
observation is the average outcome in 1-week bins based on the birth date of the child.
The dashed vertical lines denote the reform cutoff of July 1, 1977 ðnormalized to zeroÞ. The
solid lines are fitted triangular local linear regressions with a bandwidth of 91 days. The
window includes all children born in 1977 to eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of
the discontinuityÞ. The dashed lines mark the 95 percent confidence intervals.
398 journal of political economyshown in table 8.
We see that the fall in the dropout rate resulting from the reform was
3.6 percent for the children of mothers with less than 10 years of edu-
cation, whereas it was only 1.8 percent for the children of mothers with
10 years of education or more. When we look at college attendance, we
also see a stronger impact for children born to mothers with lower edu-
cation. Interestingly, the pattern is the opposite for earnings at age 30.This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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TABLE 8




Less than 10 Years
ð1Þ
10 Years or More
ð2Þ
Children:





























Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as
a result of the maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear
regressions including triangular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and sepa-
rate trends on each side of the discontinuity. Numbers in parentheses are the
standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in brackets are the means
of the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We include the number of
observations for each outcome. The RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975,
1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. Column 1
shows the results when mothers had less than 10 years of education. Column 2
shows the results when mothers had 10 years or more of education. We have
missing information about the mother’s education for 922 observations.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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However, we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis that the im-
pacts of the maternity leave reform do not vary with the education of
400 journal of political economythe mother.
D. Results by Quartiles of Mothers’ Unpaid LeaveTable 9 shows how the impact of the reform on mothers’ and children’s
outcomes varies according to the quartiles of unpaid leave taken by the
mother. In principle, this variable should be affected by the reform, and
therefore, we should not condition on it. In practice, we see that the
reform had no effect on unpaid leave. If the ranking of mothers in terms
of unpaid leave does not depend on the reform, we can interpret these
estimates as the effects of the reform on mothers who would have taken
different levels of unpaid leave in the absence of the reform and on their
children.
We see almost no effect on mothers’ outcomes at any quartile. The
only exception is maternal employment 2 years after the birth of the
child, which declined slightly at both extremes of the unpaid leave dis-
tribution. This indicates a substantial increase in mothers’ time spent at
home across the distribution of eligible mothers ðbecause paid leave in-
creased for all of themÞ.
For children, we see that the effect on dropout rates was very large at
the first and second quartiles of unpaid leave ð5 percent and 2 percent,
respectivelyÞ, while we see no effect at the third and fourth quartiles.
This is also confirmed by the earnings results, which showed that the
reform led to 7 percent higher earnings at the first and second quartiles
but had no effect at the top two quartiles.
Mothers in the first two quartiles had levels of unpaid leave well below
the average ð0.4 and 5.1 months, respectivelyÞ. We see the largest effects
on dropout rates and earnings for these mothers ðthe outcomes that are
the most robust among our resultsÞ, which suggests that additional time
with the child was the most important factor during the earliest months
of the child’s life. It is possible that these differences were not entirely a
result of increases in health ðsay, because of breast-feeding; see the evi-
dence discussed in the Appendix, which uses time-series data to suggest
that there was no detectable impact of the reform on breast-feedingÞ.
There may have been an impact on mother-child attachment and a
reduction in stress in the home, leading to changes in personality traits
that made these children less likely to drop out of high school.
E. Are There Substantial Differences in the Impact of the
Reform According to Other Criteria?Table 10 shows that the impact of the reform on dropout rates was
higher for children born in rural areas and for those who grew up liv-This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ing close to their grandparents. By contrast, the impact on earnings was
larger for those living in urban areas and for those who grew up far from
TABLE 9
Children’s and Mothers’ Outcomes, by Quartiles of Mothers’ Months
of Unpaid Leave: Nonparametric RD-DD Regressions







Average level of unpaid leave ðSDÞ .40 4.64 8.55 16.68
ð.63Þ ð1.39Þ ð.80Þ ð9.8Þ
Children:
Dropout rate 2.053*** 2.028* .010 2.006
ð.015Þ ð.016Þ ð.016Þ ð.017Þ
½.17 ½.17 ½.19 ½.24
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
College attendance .032 .007 .008 .033
ð.025Þ ð.021Þ ð.021Þ ð.022Þ
½.50 ½.48 ½.43 ½.37
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
LnðearningsÞ at age 30 .074** .077** .035 .014
ð.032Þ ð.034Þ ð.031Þ ð.031Þ
½12.5 ½12.5 ½12.5 ½12.5
Observations 15,183 15,197 15,234 15,118
Mothers:
Employed 2 years after childbirth 2.012* 2.000 2.007 2.035*
ð.007Þ ð.011Þ ð.021Þ ð.020Þ
½.97 ½.92 ½.62 ½.39
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
Employed 5 years after childbirth .011 2.021 2.022 2.000
ð.013Þ ð.015Þ ð.020Þ ð.020Þ
½.91 ½.86 ½.68 ½.58
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
LnðincomeÞ 5 years after childbirth .203 2.308* 2.274 .010
ð.154Þ ð.172Þ ð.214Þ ð.219Þ
½10.5 ½9.6 ½7.3 ½6.0
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions including trian-
gular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the discon-
tinuity. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth.
Numbes in brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We
include the number of observations for each outcome. The RD-DD estimates used eligi-
ble births in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. Col-
umn 1 shows the results for the lowest quartile of mothers’ months of unpaid leave; col. 2,
the second quartile; col. 3, the third quartile; and col. 4, the highest quartile. The first row
shows the average levels of unpaid leave in each quartile.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
maternity leave benefits 401their grandparents. In theory, these effects could have worked in either
direction. One would expect mothers living in rural areas to be poorer,
but it is also likely that far fewer of them were eligible for the reform.This content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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TABLE 10
Children’s and Mothers’ Outcomes, by Urbanization and Distance
















Dropout rate 2.016 2.021* 2.037** .001
ð.011Þ ð.011Þ ð.017Þ ð.010Þ
½.19 ½.19 ½.19 ½.19
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
College attendance .016 .023 .021 .017
ð.015Þ ð.016Þ ð.023Þ ð.015Þ
½.45 ½.44 ½.42 ½.44
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
LnðearningsÞ at age 30 .065*** .035 .047 .053**
ð.023Þ ð.024Þ ð.029Þ ð.021Þ
½12.5 ½12.5 ½12.5 ½12.5
Observations 30,034 30,698 15,375 35,189
others:
Predicted months of unpaid leave .097 2.076 .359 2.013
ð.217Þ ð.225Þ ð.328Þ ð.200Þ
½7.4 ½7.9 ½8.1 ½7.6
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
Employed 2 years after childbirth 2.018 2.015 2.005 2.021*
ð.014Þ ð.013Þ ð.020Þ ð.012Þ
½.73 ½.71 ½.70 ½.72
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
Employed 5 years after childbirth 2.016 2.001 2.007 2.009
ð.013Þ ð.013Þ ð.018Þ ð.012Þ
½.76 ½.76 ½.74 ½.75
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
LnðincomeÞ 5 years after childbirth 2.160 2.050 2.064 2.115
ð.143Þ ð.148Þ ð.203Þ ð.133Þ
½8.4 ½8.3 ½8.0 ½8.2
Observations 31,569 32,002 15,945 36,912
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
aternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions including triangu-
r weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the discontinuity.
umbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in
rackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We include the
umber of observations for each outcome. The RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975,
977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. Columns 1 and 2 show the
sults when parents were from an urban or rural area, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 show
e results for children who lived close to or far from their grandparents, respectively. We
ave missing information about the distance to grandparents for 10,714 observations.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
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Thus, there is probably a differential selection into eligibility among
mothers in rural and urban areas. Similarly, living close to grandparents
maternity leave benefits 403could imply that low-cost child care was more easily available, but the
quality of care provided by the grandparents could have been higher
or lower than the alternative care children received when they lived far
from their grandparents.
The reform had different effects according to prereform family in-
come and the state of the local labor market at the time of childbirth.
Table 11 shows the results according to quartiles of family income. In
contrast to maternal education, these are relatively short-term mea-
sures of the household environment. Most of the impacts of the reform
on child outcomes were still stronger for children born to mothers whose
prebirth income was below the median. Interestingly, the reform had a
relatively strong and negative impact on the labor market outcomes of
mothers in the upper part of the prebirth income distribution, although
this did not correspond to child outcomes.
We mentioned above that the reform could also have had an effect
by shifting the availability of income toward those months immediately
after childbirth, even if there was no change in total income. If some
households were severely credit constrained, this may have made a dif-
ference to the child. Although it is unlikely that severe credit constraints
of this sort were important in Norway in this period, our results are
consistent with this interpretation if we presume that those with low lev-
els of prereform income were the most likely to be credit constrained.
There are, of course, other explanations that do not require credit con-
straints specifically but are associated only with poverty.
In addition, we found that the completed fertility and marital stability
of mothers had no mediating effect on the reform’s impact on children
ðsee table 12Þ.
We also analyzed the impact of the reform on older siblings ðsee ta-
ble 13Þ. The fact that mothers spent additional time in the home could
have benefited siblings. However, this was not found to be the case,
which suggests that what determined the impact of the reform was spe-
cific to the relationship between the mother and the newborn child
ðperhaps because of a stronger attachment between the two, with ben-
efits for mother and childÞ. In addition, we found that the impact of the
reform on education was determined mainly by females, while the im-
pact of the reform on earnings at age 30 was determined by males ðsee
table 14Þ.
Table 15 compares the impacts of the reform for firstborn versus later-
born children. It shows that for education and earnings, the impact was
stronger for later-born children. This is consistent with the idea that
time with the mother is important because later-born children would
probably face more competition for maternal time than firstborn childrenThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TABLE 11
Children’s and Mothers’ Outcomes, by Quartiles of Log Family Income
2 Years Prior to Birth: Nonparametric RD-DD Regressions
Quartiles of LnðFamily IncomeÞ







Dropout rate 2.030* 2.020 2.015 2.007
ð.016Þ ð.016Þ ð.015Þ ð.014Þ
½.24 ½.21 ½.18 ½.14
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
College attendance .033 .038* 2.021 .028
ð.024Þ ð.022Þ ð.021Þ ð.022Þ
½.41 ½.42 ½.45 ½.50
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
LnðearningsÞ at age 30 .041 .081** .025 .042
ð.036Þ ð.033Þ ð.033Þ ð.035Þ
½12.4 ½12.5 ½12.5 ½12.5
Observations 15,090 15,227 15,248 15,167
Mothers:
Predicted months of unpaid leave .054 2.095 .001 .176
ð.391Þ ð.334Þ ð.327Þ ð.316Þ
½8.4 ½8.1 ½7.4 ½6.6
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
Employed 2 years after childbirth .015 2.017 2.052*** 2.011
ð.019Þ ð.019Þ ð.018Þ ð.018Þ
½.69 ½.70 ½.73 ½.77
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
Employed 5 years after childbirth .006 .019 2.030 2.037**
ð.017Þ ð.017Þ ð.018Þ ð.018Þ
½.73 ½.75 ½.77 ½.79
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
LnðincomeÞ 5 years after childbirth .007 .251 2.346* 2.416**
ð.189Þ ð.182Þ ð.207Þ ð.211Þ
½7.8 ½8.1 ½8.5 ½8.9
Observations 15,893 15,893 15,892 15,893
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions including trian
gular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the discontinuity
Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in
brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We include the
number of observations for each outcome. The RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975
1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ. Column 1 shows the re
sults for the lowest quartile of family income; col. 2, the second quartile; col. 3, the third
quartile; and col. 4, the highest quartile.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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would, and they would therefore benefit more from a relaxation of the
time constraint.
TABLE 12
Mothers’ Part-Time Work in 1980, Completed Fertility
ðNumber of Children in 2007Þ, and Marital Stability in 2007:












RD 2.013 2.027 2.008
ð.017Þ ð.032Þ ð.017Þ
½.43 ½2.53 ½.73
Observations 15,036 15,025 15,025
RD-DD years




Observations 63,571 63,571 63,571
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a
result of the maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear
regressions including triangular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate
trends on each side of the discontinuity. Numbers in parentheses are the stan-
dard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in brackets are the means of
the different outcomes for the prereform sample. We include the number of
observations for each outcome. The RD estimates used only eligible births in
1977, whereas the RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975, 1977, 1978, and
1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
maternity leave benefits 405VIII. Concluding RemarksWe investigated the long-term consequences of mothers’ time invest-
ment in their children during their first year of life. We explored em-
pirically the variation in time spent with the child induced by the ma-
ternity leave reform in Norway in 1977, which offered up to 4 months of
paid leave and an additional full year of unpaid leave. The reform re-
sulted in a substantial increase in the time mothers spent at home ðaway
from workÞ after birth, presumably caring for their newborn children,
instead of relying on informal care alternatives. We found that the re-
form had strong effects on children’s subsequent high school dropout
rates and earnings at age 30, especially for those whose mothers had less
than 10 years of education.
In order to understand these results, it is important to specify the
possible child care arrangements available in the 1970s in Norway asThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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alternatives to maternal care. There was almost no high-quality child
care for under 2-year-olds, so the alternative was care by grandparents or
TABLE 13












RD 2.036 .031 2.164
ð.024Þ ð.029Þ ð.146Þ
½.19 ½.50 ½12.3
Observations 6,264 6,264 6,264
RD-DD years




Observations 27,234 27,234 27,234
Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes as a result of the
maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local linear regressions including trian
gular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days, and separate trends on each side of the disconti
nuity. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth
Numbers in brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample
We include the number of observations for each outcome. The RD estimates used only
eligible births in 1977, whereas the RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975, 1977
1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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other types of informal care. Neither of these was necessarily a good
substitute for a mother’s time in this period of a child’s life.
The estimated positive effects of early time with the child on his or
her medium- to long-term outcomes resemble the relatively large effects
found recently as a result of other early investments in children, such as
the Perry Program and Project STAR ðHeckman et al. 2010; Chetty et al.
2011Þ.
Our results suggest that policies facilitating increases in parents’ time
with children during the first year of life may have a positive impact on
children’s abilities later in life, especially if there are no existing ma-
ternity leave benefits within the jurisdiction in question. This has been
an important argument behind expansions in maternity leave programs
across many countries. However, this study is the first to show that the
argument may be empirically justified in terms of children’s long-term
outcomes.
The level of maternity leave benefits in the United States today is
remarkably similar to that in Norway before the 1977 reform. Parental
leave is currently under debate in the United States ðUSA Today, July 26,
2005; New York Times, April 16, 2008Þ, and an introduction of 4 months
f paid leave and better job protection is within the set of feasible pol-
ies ðFederal Employees Paid Parental Leave Act of 2007Þ. Recall, how-
TABLE 14






































Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes
as a result of the maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local
linear regressions including triangular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days,
and separate trends on each side of the discontinuity. Numbers in pa-
rentheses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers
in brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform
sample. We include the number of observations for each outcome. The
RD-DD estimates used eligible births in 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182
days on either side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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ever, the evidence from other countries, namely, Germany, Sweden, and
Denmark, suggesting that expansions of maternity leave benefits on top
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Using a rich set of family background variables to address the het-
erogeneity of effects gave us the advantage of making the study less de-
TABLE 15






































Note.—Each cell presents the estimated discontinuity in the outcomes
as a result of the maternity leave reform on July 1, 1977. We used local
linear regressions including triangular weights, a bandwidth of 91 days,
and separate trends on each side of the discontinuity. Numbers in paren-
theses are the standard errors clustered at the date of birth. Numbers in
brackets are the means of the different outcomes for the prereform sample.
We include the number of observations for each outcome. The RD-DD es-
timatesusedeligiblebirths in1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979 ð182 days on either
side of the discontinuityÞ.
* Significant at 10 percent.
** Significant at 5 percent.
*** Significant at 1 percent.
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that the effects were larger for children from less educated households
may be important for policy discussions related to lowering inequalityThis content downloaded from 158.37.101.119 on Fri, 4 Sep 2015 04:43:10 AM
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in general. Many countries, such as the United States or the United King-
dom, have substantial degrees of inequality in education and income lev-
maternity leave benefits 409els, which have been linked to higher rates of intergenerational trans-
mission of poverty. While increasing maternity leave for women and men
in these countries will not solve these problems, we have shown that it
might reduce the existing gap.AppendixBreast-Feeding
Mainly using a survey from one maternity hospital in Norway over time, Liestøl,
Rosenberg, and Walløe ð1988Þ describe patterns of breast-feeding over about
150 years. They show that breast-feeding in Norway started to decline around 1920
and reached its lowest point around 1967, when only 30 percent of mothers were
breast-feeding their infants for 3 months and as few as 5 percent were breast-
feeding them for 9 months. By the late 1970s, the level of breast-feeding in
Norway had returned to the level in 1940. Around the period of the maternityFIG. A1.—Breast-feeding in Norway: eligible mothers in 1977. Each observation is the
average outcome in a 1-week bin based on the birth date of the child. The dashed vertica
line denotes the reform cutoff of July 1, 1977 ðnormalized to zeroÞ. The solid line is a
fitted triangular local linear regression with a bandwidth of 91 days. The window include
all children born in 1977 to eligible mothers ð182 days on either side of the discontinuityÞ
The dashed lines mark the 95 percent confidence interval.
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leave reform that we consider, about 75 percent of mothers were breast-feeding
for 3 months, 50 percent for 6 months, and 25 percent for 9 months or more.
410 journal of political economyClearly, there was an increase in the rate of breast-feeding in this period in our
data set.
We used survey data recording mothers’ answers when asked about their
breast-feeding practices for all of their children and calculated the average num-
ber of months of breast-feeding. The survey data were from a health data set
covering all 40-year-olds in the early 1990s ðthe 40-Year-Old SurveyÞ. We were
able to match about 5 percent of the children in our sample. However, as we
have data on the entire population of children, we still have more than 100 ob-
servations for each month. This data set is nonetheless too small to establish a
convincing regression design, but in figure A1 we show the average number of
months of breast-feeding according to the date of birth for all eligible mothers
in 1977 and 1975. First, this shows that breast-feeding increased from 1975 to
1977, which is consistent with the data from Bernal and Keane ð2010Þ. However,
there was no increase in breast-feeding after the reform in 1977.25 If anything,
there was a small decline in the average number of months of breast-feeding in
1977. This indicates that breast-feeding is probably not the most important mech-
anism behind the positive effects of the reform on children’s outcomes.
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